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ABSTRACT
Crowdsourcing is a form of “peer production” in which work
traditionally performed by an employee is outsourced to an
“undefined, generally large group of people in the form of
an open call.” We present a model of workers supplying
labor to paid crowdsourcing projects. We also introduce a
novel method for estimating a worker’s reservation wage—
the smallest wage a worker is willing to accept for a task and
the key parameter in our labor supply model. It shows that
the reservation wages of a sample of workers from Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) are approximately log nor-
mally distributed, with a median wage of $1.38/hour. At
the median wage, the point elasticity of extensive labor sup-
ply is 0.43. We discuss how to use our calibrated model to
make predictions in applied work. Two experimental tests
of the model show that many workers respond rationally to
offered incentives. However, a non-trivial fraction of sub-
jects appear to set earnings targets. These “target earners”
consider not just the offered wage—which is what the ra-
tional model predicts—but also their proximity to earnings
goals. Interestingly, a number of workers clearly prefer earn-
ing total amounts evenly divisible by 5, presumably because
these amounts make good targets.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics;; J.m
[Computer Applications]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Design, Economics
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing is a form of“peer production”that outsources
work traditionally performed by an employee to an “unde-
fined, generally large group of people in the form of an open
call” [2, 11]. Despite the successes and the perceived promise
of crowdsourcing,1 would-be users face a serious practical
challenge: they need to attract a crowd. Crowdsourcing
projects have used a variety of inducements, including en-
tertainment [20], information [1, 13], the chance to be al-
truistic and attention from others [12]. Until recently, it
was extremely difficult to offer a crowd money, but with the
advent of online labor markets like oDesk, Elance and Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT), buyers can now easily pay
workers with cash [8].
Compared to cash, non-monetary crowdsourcing incentives
are limited in at least two ways. First, some non-monetary
incentives depend on the nature of the task or the identity
of the proposer, which limits their usefulness. For example,
tasks such as classifying web pages, transcribing scanned
documents and validating search results are ideal for crowd-
sourcing, yet they are unlikely to attract volunteers because
they are tedious and the private benefits come only to the
proposer. Second, even when appropriate non-monetary in-
centives exist, they are hard to adjust. For example, assum-
ing one could compute a “fun” labor supply elasticity, , it
is not clear how we could make a task 10(1/)% more fun
in order to boost provision by 10%. With cash incentives,
computing supply elasticities is straightforward and making
price adjustments is easy.
The possibility of cash payments raises a design question:
how does one effectively and efficiently employ monetary in-
centives? To solve this problem, designers need two things:
(1) a theoretical model that predicts how people will re-
spond to different price/task scenarios and (2) data-driven
refinements of that model. The refinements should allow the
model to account for behavioral biases—such as those iden-
tified by experimental economics—and the idiosyncrasies of
particular applications. Borrowing an analogy from the economist
and market designer Al Roth, just as builders of suspension
bridges must be informed by both the elegant theory of me-
chanics and the messy details of metallurgy and geology,
builders of social systems must possess both a general the-
ory of behavior and detailed contextual knowledge [17].
An appropriate theoretical model for the labor supply as-
pect of crowdsourcing design should tell the designer (1)
how workers decide whether or not to participate in a crowd-
sourcing project and (2) how workers decide the amount to
1 Examples include Wikipedia, Digg, Yelp, Yahoo! Answers
and InnoCentive.
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produce, conditional upon participating. In the language of
economics, the designer must be able to predict the labor
supply on both the (1) extensive and (2) intensive margins.
These two aspects of labor supply have intrigued economists
from Adam Smith onward, but because crowdsourcing“jobs”
last seconds and pay pennies, results from conventional labor
economics might not transfer readily (or at least not with-
out modification). This caveat aside, labor economics offers
a theoretical framework for understanding decision-making
in paid crowdsourcing scenarios, and it potentially provides
the predictive model that designers need.
1.1 Overview
There are several papers on the design of incentives in crowd-
sourcing [5] and on obtaining work from AMT [18, 19], but
our paper is most closely related to work by Watts and
Mason [16], who also conducted labor supply experiments.
They found that workers respond to prices in a way that is at
least consistent with rational behavior. However, their find-
ings also suggest that the relationship between incentives
and output is complex: higher pay rates did not improve
work quality—a result the authors attribute to high wages
affecting worker beliefs. They also found that the structure
of incentives (i.e., whether workers faced a piece rate or a
quota system) affected output.
Motivated by the evidence from [16] that AMT workers re-
spond to cash incentives, in Section 2.1 we develop a sim-
ple rational model of crowdsourcing labor supply. We also
present a novel method for estimating the reservation wage
of each worker (Section 2.3) that makes use of a highly con-
cave earnings function rather than a simple piece-rate.2 The
reservation wage is the minimum wage a worker is willing
to accept as compensation in exchange for performing some
task; it is the key parameter in models of labor supply.
With subjects recruited from AMT, we test the predictions
of the model and its underlying assumption in two sepa-
rate experiments. Subjects performed simple tasks in which
they chose how much output to produce. We test whether
subjects adjusted output in response to task difficulty (Ex-
periment A, Section 4) and price (Experiment B, Section 5).
We find mixed evidence for the rational model: workers are
clearly sensitive to price but insensitive to variations in the
amount of time it takes to complete a task.
Reservation wages are supposed to be fixed and thus should
be invariant to our experimental manipulations. Although
we find that the imputed wage distributions are quite simi-
lar in Experiment A, large differences appear in Experiment
B. The cause seems to be that some workers workers are
“target earners” who focus on reaching salient earnings tar-
gets. This stands in sharp contrast to the rational model
that predicts workers should only consider the offered wage.
These findings have important implications for the design of
incentives and are discussed in Section 6.
The rational model clearly misses important elements of re-
ality, but there are no immediate replacements and it makes
reasonable predictions in some cases. For these reasons, we
2All of our data and experimental materials
will be available on John Horton’s webpage:
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/˜horton.
demonstrate in Section 7 how the model can be used to
predict labor supply for any price/task scenario, using cal-
ibration data pooled from both experiments. We conclude
with a discussion of the contributions and limitations of the
paper and our thoughts on directions for future research.
2. THEORY
Every time-consuming activity generates an opportunity cost.
The opportunity cost of doing A is the foregone net bene-
fits one would have obtained from doing a next best option
B. Researchers generally cannot observe the net benefits of
a person’s options, but when they observe them doing A,
they can infer that they find doing A preferable to doing B,
with all rewards and costs for the two tasks being taken into
account. Applying this inference to work decisions yields
a prediction: a person will work only when the net benefits
from working exceed the hypothetical net benefits from their
next best alternative, be it another job, leisure or a renewed
job search. In labor models, the economic value of this “next
best alternative” is characterized as a reservation wage.
The reservation wage is difficult to estimate in practice for
at least two reasons. First, all jobs offer a mixture of non-
monetary benefits and costs, or amenities and dis-amenities.
For example, there are obvious non-monetary differences be-
tween working as a coal miner and working as an ice cream
taste-tester. Second, observing someone working tells us
only that their total benefits exceed total costs, but not
what those total cost actually are. Imagine a job offers a
wage w and a stream of amenities, a, and a stream of dis-
amenities, d. If the worker works for time t, they receive
benefits (w + a)t and bear costs dt. If the worker has a
reservation wage, ω, then observing someone working tells
us only that w + a− d ≥ ω.
To estimate ω, we need to identify the worker’s indiffer-
ence point, i.e., the w∗ where w∗ + a − d = ω. To push
a worker down to his or her indifference point, we could
continuously lower their wage by small amounts until they
chose to quit. Assuming workers viewed this process san-
guinely and their marginal costs were not increasing, their
wage when they exit—i.e., when they are indifferent between
working and continuing—is their reservation wage for that
task. This “decreasing wage” method is clearly impractical
in traditional labor relationships, but [4] show that it can
easily be done for small, piece-rate tasks when the process
is explained up front and workers have little emotional in-
vestment in their seconds-old “job.” In our experiments, we
capitalize on this feature of piece-rate work and and use a
continuously decreasing payment function.
2.1 Model of labor supply
Because the payments in crowdsourcing contexts are so small,
we do not expect a worker’s marginal utility of wealth to
change while working and thus we assume u(w) = w. Work-
ers choose some positive, continuous quantity to produce,
y ≥ 0. They are paid P (y) for their choice of y. Let
P ′(y) = p(y). We assume that P (y) is strictly increasing,
p() > 0, and concave, p′() < 0. We assume that it costs the
worker C(y) to complete y tasks, with C′(y) = c(y). The
worker’s maximization problem is:
max
y
P (y)− C(y) s.t. y ≥ 0 (1)
The first-order condition is p(y∗) = c(y∗), i.e., the marginal
benefit equals marginal cost. An interior solution exists only
when B(y) = P (y)−C(y) reaches a global maximum, which
occurs when B(y) is concave.
2.2 Cost curves and output
In most applied contexts, P () will be linear (i.e., a constant
piece-rate), so B(y) will be concave only when −C(y) is
strictly concave, i.e., marginal costs are increasing. If a task
is very tiring, marginal costs are increasing (c′(y) > 0), but
this is not necessarily the case: costs could be decreasing
if workers get better with experience (c′(y) < 0), and costs
can also be approximately linear (c′(y) = 0) or even have
different properties at different points (e.g., decreasing at
first, then linear).
Consistent with our opportunity cost framework, we assume
that the only costs of performing a task is the time it takes:
C(y) =
∫ y
0
ωt(x)dx where t() is the marginal completion
time and hence c(y) = t(y)ω. The advantage of this as-
sumption is that because the t(y) curve is observable, we
can tell whether costs are increasing, decreasing or constant.
In our experiments, we find that completion times are essen-
tially constant and we assume linear costs.3 This linearity
is unsurprising given the simplicity and brevity of our tasks.
In practice P () is often linear, with a constant piece-rate pi
for each unit of output, giving a payment function P (y) =
piy. If costs are linear, there is no interior solution and work-
ers are willing to produce either nothing when ω > pi/t or
an infinite amount when ω < pi/t. The actual manifestation
of this pheneomena is that worker’s either produce nothing
or produce all the way up to some cap set by employers.
For example, in the experiments run by [16], workers could
choose how many picture sorting tasks to perform, up to a
cap of 100 and with each task paying a constant amount. In
the experimenter’s high-wage, low-difficulty condition, mean
output was over 90 tasks, and presumably many of the sub-
jects hit the 100 task cap.
2.3 Using the payment function to impute the
reservation wage
With linear costs and a linear payment function (constant
piece-rate), an interior solution to the maximization problem
does not exist. However, if we make P (y) strictly concave
by having the piece-rate fall with greater output, then an in-
terior solution at p(y∗) = ωt0 exists. A worker’s estimated
reservation wage is then estimated directly from their output
choice: if a worker completes y∗i , then ωˆi =
p(y∗i )
t¯i
, where t¯i is
the worker’s average completion time. If costs were increas-
ing, then instead of a point estimate of costs, tˆ0, we use
some parametric prediction, tˆi(y
∗
i ) (recall that we observe
completion times).
3Excluding the very first task, completion times rise by less
than 1 millisecond per task. There is, however, a gap be-
tween the first task and second task, with the second task
requiring about 1.5 fewer seconds
For ease of exposition, we modeled worker output as contin-
uous. In most practical crowdsourcing applications, subjects
make discrete output choices. Subjects chose some number
of whole number of tasks to complet and P (y) =
∫ y
0
p(x)dx.
The discrete analog to this function is P (y) =
∑y
x=0 p(x),
hence p(y+ 1) = P (y+ 1)−P (y). When output is discrete,
measuring reservation wages is somewhat more complex, but
we know that ωi ≤ p(y∗i )/t¯i and ωi > p(y∗i + 1)/t¯i. If the
piece-rate tasks are small and output is fine-grained, then:
ωˆi ≈ (2t¯i)−1 [p(y∗i ) + p(y∗i + 1)]
reasonably approximates the reservation wage.
To use this method, it is important that workers are aware
that the marginal payment is falling and will continue to fall.
Otherwise, incorrect expectations that wages might increase
eventually might cause them to continue working even when
wages fall below their reservation wage.
3. EXPERIMENTAL PRELIMINARIES
Any reasonable labor supply model should predict that low-
ering wages will reduce output. There are two ways to lower
a person’s wages: (a) increase the output they must produce
in order to earn their previous wage or (b) lower their wage
while keeping the required amount of work constant. As we
will show, our model predicts that output will fall in either
scenario. We then test these predictions in two experiments.
In Experiment A, we test whther increasing the task diffi-
culty reduces output, and in Experiment B, we test whether
lowering wages reduces output. Both of our experiments
had the same basic set-up: workers from AMT were asked
to perform piece-rate tasks. Critically, they had complete
freedom to choose how many pieces to complete. Before we
discuss the experiments in depth, we first provide necessary
background information.
3.1 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is an online labor market where
workers can perform “Human Intelligence Tasks” (HIT) for
“requesters.” HITs vary, but most are small, simple tasks
that are difficult for computers, but relatively easy for hu-
mans. Common tasks include transcribing audio clips, clas-
sifying and tagging images, reviewing documents and check-
ing websites for pornographic content. When posting a HIT,
a requester describes the task, sets a piece-rate payment,
sets worker qualifications, determines how long workers can
work on the task, determines how many times they want
each HIT performed and creates an interface for workers to
use when working on the task.
To become an AMT worker, a person must create an AMT
account and provide Amazon with a bank account number.
Workers are only allowed to have one account, and Amazon
uses several technical and legal means to enforce this restric-
tion. Workers can observe the collection of HITs and their
attributes prior to starting work and can normally view a
sample of the required work before starting. They are free
to work on any task for which they are qualified, and they
can begin work immediately after accepting a HIT. Once
a worker completes a HIT, they must submit it for review.
A requester then may review the work and decide whether
or not to “approve” the HIT. If the HIT is approved, the
worker is paid the piece-rate. The worker is also paid if
the requester does not review and approve the work within
a specified amount of time. Solely at their discretion, re-
questers may “reject” work, in which case the worker is not
paid.4 Requesters may also elect to pay bonuses, which
makes it easy to tailor payments to individual workers based
on their performance within a nominally piece-rate HIT.
3.2 Conduct of the experiments
Experiment A and B were conducted in sequence, with ap-
proximately 3 days between them. Of the 92 subjects who
participated in A, 38 of them also participated in B, which
had 198 subjects.
Subjects were not informed that the task had an experimen-
tal component. The HIT was simply posted on AMT like
any other HIT, with the task title “User interface test.” It
is important to note that all subjects read identical instruc-
tions before accepting the HIT and before observing any
unique feature of their assigned treatment group. Thus we
are confident that subjects did not select out of the experi-
ment in response to the nature of their assigned treatment.
In both experiments, all subjects accepting the HIT submit-
ted a response, so no outcome data are missing.5
3.3 Task and user interface
For a crowdsourcing task, we had subjects click back and
forth between two narrow vertical bars separated by some
number of pixels. The “target” bar was green and the other
bar was gray. The target bar alternated between the left bar
and the right bar, with the first target bar always begining
on the left. If they missed a bar, the bar flashed red but
workers could continue. Figure 1 represents the interface
and the cursor movement needed to complete the task.
We chose the clicking task because it is time consuming,
requires the full attention of subjects and is not obviously
fun. This task is also culturally neutral, easy to understand
and easy to make harder (by narrowing the bars or spacing
the bars farther apart). We organized work into blocks, with
each block consisting of 10 back-and-forth clicks. A block
is one unit of output (i.e., if a worker completes 3 blocks,
y = 3). Subjects had 4 seconds to complete each click. If
they did not perform the click within this time, the HIT
ended, but across both experiments, no subject exceeded
this cutoff. If a subject missed more than 40% of the clicks
in a block, the HIT ended. As with the time cutoff, no
subject came anywhere close to this limit. We capped total
output at 200 blocks, but this proved unnecessary as the
observed maximum output was only 58 blocks.
After completing a block, subjects chose whether to quit
or continue. If they had already completed y − 1 blocks,
they were offered p(y) to perform an additional block, where,
p(y) = P (y)−P (y−1). If they chose to quit, they performed
no more tasks and earned P (y− 1). When making this exit
decision, the interface showed then all the relevant rates and
4[10] provide a model of the accept/reject decision in mar-
kets like AMT and show under what conditions an “all re-
ject” equilibrium does not occur.
5A discussion of the causal inference issues raised by
revealed-preference experiments conducted online can be
found in [9].
totals, as well as their error rate and their average per-block
completion time in seconds. Subjects could rest as long as
they liked before starting a new block.
Figure 1: Crowdsourcing task. Subjects were asked
to click between the two vertical rectangles. The
“target” bar (shown on left here) was always colored
green.
3.4 Payment function for our experiments
To create a concave payment function, each subsequent piece
of work must pay less than the previous piece of work, but
still offer positive payment. One payment function with this
property is:
P (y) = P¯
(
1− e−ky
)
(2)
Note that total earnings asymptotically approach P¯ as y
increases. The parameter k ≥ 0 can be thought of as deter-
mining the “half-life” of the payment schedule. For example,
if a given k∗ has the property that P (10, k∗) = 1
2
P¯ , then the
half-life of the schedule is 10 tasks. In all experiments, we
used a half-life of 10; Table 1 shows samples of the total
earnings and the marginal payment using Equation 2, given
this half-life.6
Table 1: Sample earnings and wages with 10 task
half-life
y P (y)/P¯ p(y + 1)/P¯
1 0.07 0.0625
5 0.29 0.0474
25 0.82 0.0118
One complication in our payment scheme is that it is im-
possible to pay workers fractional cents. To circumvent this
problem, we used a payment system where a worker was
paid all of their whole-cent earnings for sure, and their frac-
tional earnings stochastically. If a worker earned h whole
cents and f fractions of a cent, with probability 1 − f , we
paid them h and with probability f , we paid them h + 1.
Payment was thus correct in expectation, since E[P (y)] =
(1− f)h+ (h+ 1)f = h+ f . This procedure was explained
to subjects before they joined the experiment.
6For subjects producing only one unit of output, an ad-
justment must be made when imputing reservation wages
beacuse P (1) needs to incorporate the “show-up” fee.
4. EXPERIMENT A: ∆ DIFFICULTY
In Experiment A, subjects were randomly assigned to groups
EASY and HARD. The only difference between the two
groups was that in EASY the vertical bars were 100 pix-
els apart compared to 600 pixels apart in HARD. Of the
92 subjects that participated, 42 were assigned to EASY
and 38 were self-reported females. Subjects completed a to-
tal of 18934 clicks. In both groups, subjects’ earnings were
determined using the same payment function, Equation 2,
with the parameter values of P¯ = 10 and k = 10−1 log 1/2.
With these parameter values, total earnings asymptotically
approached 10 cents and the “half-life” was 10 blocks, i.e.,
P (10) = 5.
4.1 Model prediction
Using the first-order condition from Equation 1, p(y) = ωt
(for simplicity, we drop the ∗ notation) and treating optimal
output as a function of t, we take the total derivative with
respect to t and get y′(t) = ω/p′(y(t)). Because p′() < 0,
it follows that y′(t) < 0. As expected, increasing the unit
completion time reduces a worker’s output.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Effort
Usurprisingly, subjects assigned to HARD needed more time
to complete a block. Regressing average per block comple-
tion time (in seconds), T¯i, on the treatment indicator EASYi
(with robust standard errors under each coefficient) 7 we
have:
T¯i = −4.885︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.25
·EASYi + 10.931︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.2
with R2 = 0.13 and sample size N = 92. The treatment ef-
fect is large and highly significant: subjects in HARD took
about 11 seconds to complete a block; subjects in EASY
only needed about 6 seconds. If we examine between-click
times instead of average block completion times, we see fur-
ther evidence that the treatment was effective. In Figure 2,
the distributions for both “hits” an “misses” are shown for
each group. As expected, the “hit” distribution for HARD is
right-shifted. Confirming our intuitions about the relation-
ship between effort and quality, misses were associated with
faster cursor movement.
4.2.2 Output
Even though subjects in HARD needed more time to com-
plete each block, they had nearly the same pattern of output
as subjects in EASY. Figure 3 shows output histograms for
both groups. There is no discernible difference in mean out-
put, and although although more workers in HARD quit
after performing just one block (12 vs. 7), this difference is
not statistically significant.8 Regressing output on a group
indicator we have:
yi = −0.247︸ ︷︷ ︸
3.76
·EASYi + 20.08︸ ︷︷ ︸
2.72
with R2 = 5e − 05 and the sample size 92. Subjects in
EASY had slightly less average output, though the effect
7All standard errors in the paper are robust.
8We regressed 1{yi = 1} on EASYi.
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Figure 2: Distribution of time-between-clicks for
“hits” and “misses” by treatment group. Distribu-
tions are computed using a kernel density estimator.
is imprecisely estimated. Transforming output with the log
function and running the same regression we have:
log yi = 0.136︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.28
·EASYi + 2.298︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.2
with R2 = 0.00256 and N = 92. Even though the coeffi-
cient on EASY changes signs, both the regressions and the
graphical analysis of Figure 3 lead to the same conclusion:
despite the greater time required per-block for subjects in
HARD, there was no discernible difference in the patterns
of output across groups.
4.2.3 Reservation wages
We imputed the reservation wage for each subject using the
method explained in Section 2.3. The distribution of the
log of estimates is plotted in Figure 4, which shows both
the smooth kernel density estimate of the distributions as
well as the the actual estimated values (displayed as tick
marks along the horizontal axis). The top two panels contain
the results of Experiment A. We can see that the imputed
reservation wage distributions are quite similar, except that
HARD has a fat left tail, implying that a cluster of workers
in HARD exhibited output patterns consistent with very low
reservation wages. However, this could be due to sampling
variance. Indeed, in a regression of log reservation wages on
a group indicator we have:
log ωˆi = 0.523︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.37
·EASYi +−0.117︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.26
with R2 = 0.02 and sample size N = 92. Assignment
to EASY had a positive but statistically insignificant ef-
fect. The coefficients in this regression are more easily in-
terpretable following transformation. They imply that the
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Figure 3: Output by task difficulty. The red vertical
line indicates mean output in both groups, while the
shaded band shows plus/minus the standard error in
the estimated mean. Bins have unit length.
geometric mean reservation wage was $0.89/hour in HARD
and $1.5/hour in EASY.
4.3 Discussion
The experimental results are theoretically ambiguous but
are internally consistent. Given that workers in HARD took
longer per task but had essentially the same output pattern
compared to subjects in EASY, we would expect subjects in
HARD to have relatively higher reservation wages, which is
what we find, albeit the effect only has a t-statistic of 1.41.
Perhaps the simplest explanation for the lack of treatment
effects is that our treatment was not strong enough and that
workers are not attuned to fairly small differences in time.
The quote by Lord Lionel Robbins about the “marginal util-
ity of not bothering with marignal utility” seems particular
apt, especially if worker’s have a heuristic task-based (as
opposed to time based) reservation rate.
5. EXPERIMENT B: ∆ PRICE
In Experiment B, 198 subjects were randomly assigned to
groups HIGH and LOW. The task was identical in both
groups, with the bars 100 pixels apart, but earnings asymp-
totically approached either 10 cents (in LOW ) or 30 cents
(in HIGH ). Because of the imprecise treatment effect esti-
mates in Experiment A, we doubled the sample size. By
chance, both groups had the same number of subjects. Of
the 198 subjects, 72 were self-reported females. Subjects
completed a total of 45710 clicks.
5.1 Model prediction
Consider an alternative payment function γP (y), where γ
is some positive number. The first order condition for the
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Figure 4: Imputed log reservation wage distribu-
tions both experimental groups, in both experi-
ments.
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Figure 5: Output by price group. The red vertical
line indicates mean output in both groups, while the
shaded band shows plus/minus the standard error in
the estimated mean. Bins have unit length.
original maximization problem is now γp(y) − tω = 0, and
if we treat the optimal output y as a function of γ, the total
derivative of the first order condition with respect to γ is
p(y) + γp′(y(γ))y′(γ) = 0 and thus:
y′(γ) = − p(y)
γp′(y(γ))
Because payment is strictly increasing, p() > 0, and because
the total payment function is cocave, p′() < 0, it follows that
y′(γ) > 0, i.e., output increases when payment is higher.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Output
Figure 5 shows the histogram of output in the two groups.
Although LOW has more early quits, both groups have siz-
able numbers of early quitters as well as some stalwarts that
completed in excess of 50 blocks. Unlike in Experiment A,
mean output in LOW is noticeably lower than in HIGH.
Regressing output on a group indicator we have:
yi = −2.808︸ ︷︷ ︸
2.89
·LOWi + 24.071︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
with R2 = 0.0048 and N = 198. Subjects in LOW had
lower mean output, but the effect is imprecisely estimated
due to the bi-modality of output, which can be seen in the
output histograms. Estimating the regression in logs rather
than levels we have:
log yi = −0.303︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.17
·LOWi + 2.712︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.11
with R2 = 0.02 and N = 198. There is a large and signifi-
cant difference in geometric means across the groups. From
Figure 5, it appears that most of the effect is due to the
relatively large number of subjects in LOW quitting after
small amounts of output. We can confirm this graphical ob-
servation by regressing an indicator for whether a subject
completed fewer than 10 blocks on the treatment indicator:
1{yi < 10} = 0.152︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.07
·LOWi + 0.273︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.05
with R2 = 0.03 and N = 198. The choice of 10 blocks is
somewhat arbitrary, but the effect is strong for all low cutoff
values, and a QQ-plot (not shown) makes the pattern even
more apparent.
5.2.2 Reservation Wages
Unlike in Experiment A, group assignment strongly affected
the imputed reservation wage. The bottom two panels of
Figure 4 show that the mass of observations at the center
of the distribution is left-shifted for LOW relative to HIGH.
Both distributions also have a second mass of observations
with very low reservation wages, but as with the main hump,
the LOW observersations are shifted further left than the
low-wage hump in HIGH. Regressing log wages on a group
indicator we have:
log ωˆi = −0.792︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.22
·LOWi + 0.447︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.14
with R2 = 0.06 and N = 198. Transforming the predic-
tions into levels, the geometric mean reservation wage was
$1.56/hour in HIGH and $0.71/hour in LOW.
5.3 Discussion
As per the model’s prediction, lower pay reduces output, but
the finding that being in LOW lowers a worker’s reservation
wage implies that the lower output in LOW is not as low as
it should be. Because the actual tasks are identical across
groups, the difference in imputed reservation wages cannot
be due to uncontrolled-for differences in amenities. There
are several other possible explanations for the data, includ-
ing worker error, increasing but non-time based marginal
costs and target earning behavior; we believe target earning
provides the most compelling explanation for our findings.
Worker error could explain our results: we would find lower
reservation wages in LOW if (1) subjects in LOW falsely
believe that they are being paid more than they actually
are, (2) subjects in HIGH falsely believe that they are be-
ing paid less than they actually are or (3) some combination
of (1) and (2). Liebman and Zeckhauser [15] argue that
people systematically misinterpret schedules, usually by let-
ting early marginal payments “bleed over” to affect percep-
tions of future marginal payments. However, with our con-
cave schedules, this bleed over would occur in both groups.
While we have no evidence on this question, it seems likely
that any bleed over effects would be greater in HIGH, which
would lead to effects in the opposite direction of what we do
find. Furthermore, because subjects were informed of their
precise marginal payment after each block, this bleed over
explanation seems unlikely.
Constant marginal costs are a key assuption in our reserva-
tion wage estimation method. If marginal costs are rapidly
increasing, then we would incorrectly infer that subjects in
LOW had reservation wages too low: the additional output
subjects in HIGH should produce because of their higher
wages is moderated by the higher costs of high output. Al-
though an increasing marginal cost explanation is possible,
it seems unlikley, given that subjects could rest for as much
time as they liked between blocks. Furthermore, even sub-
jects producing lots of output spent less than 15 minutes
total, including resting time (recall that per block time for
the 100 pixel group was less than 7 seconds). Rapid in-
creases in marginal costs over such a short duration of time
seem rather unlikely.9
An additional explanation for the results is that some work-
ers may be target earners. Target earners try to obtain some
self-imposed earnings goal rather than respond to the cur-
rent offered wage. If at least some workers are target earn-
ers, then the results are easy to explain: because their wages
are lower, subjects in LOW must produce more output to
acheive their earnings targets than they would have to pro-
duce if they were instead assigned to HIGH.
6. DEPARTURES FROM THE RATIONAL
MODEL
The differences in the imputed reservation wage distribution—
particularly those found in Experiment B—strongly suggest
9One possibility we must consider with more complex work
is that workers are likely to need more experience with a task
before deciding whether they are good at it. In these cases,
we might mistakenly view learning and exit as increasing
marginal costs.
that the rational model cannot explain the behavior of all
workers. Our best conjecture is that workers create earnings
targets that influence their output decisions. While having
goals seems sensible and perhaps heuristically “rational” if
the target provides motivation, earnings targets lead work-
ers to commit a kind of sunk cost fallacy because, in the
absence of income effects, past earnings are irrelevant to the
decision they must make at the margin (i.e., whether the
next bit of earnings is worth the the trouble of the next bit
of work).
To return to the suspension bridge building analogy from
Section 1, we are now dealing with metallurgy instead of
mechanics: target earners do not behave like rational work-
ers in certain contexts, and this difference will matter in
applications. For example, in the absence of income effects,
when wages are high, a target earner works less and a ra-
tional worker works more. There is mixed evidence on the
question of whether target earning occurs in “real life” [3, 6,
7], but we find fairly unambiguous evidence of target earning
in several places in the results.
The first piece of evidence of target earning is that in ev-
ery experiment, at least some subjects try to pursue the
maximum earnings possible, despite the low wages associ-
ated with this strategy. For rational workers to generate
this pattern, the wage distribution would have to be highly
bi-modal. A more plausible explanation is that workers try
to earn the full amount possible (i.e., P¯ is their target) and
only quit when they realize this goal is unattainable.10
6.1 Preferences for “focal point” earnings
More evidence of target earning can be see in the pattern of
output. In Figure 6, we plot histograms of the output for
HIGH, grouped in horizontal panels by the floor of earnings,
bP (y)c. Subjects show a preference for working the mini-
mum amount possible to earn some whole number of cents:
when multiple output values yield the same number of whole
cents, the far left bar of the histogram is the highest. The
only exception is in the 29 cent panel, however, recall that
in HIGH subjects’ earnings asymptotically approached 30
cents. Subjects quit once they realized that they could not
break out of the 29 cent band. Although suggestive of tar-
geting, the preference for whole cents could be symptomatic
of extreme risk aversion (recall from Section 3.2 that pay-
ment is stochastic due to the fractional cent problem), or
workers could believe that we might cheat them on the frac-
tional cents (i.e., ignore their fractional earnings) but that
we would not be willing to withhold whole-cent earnings.
Harder to reconcile with a rational model is another pat-
tern seen in Figure 6: subjects show a preference for earn-
ings amounts evenly divisible by 5. The smallest earnings
amounts (e.g., 2, 3 and 5 cents) all get several subjects,
but because these are people who quit very early, they pre-
sumably do not have a target or would not need a target.
However, we see clear output spikes at 15, 20 and 25 cents.
10A more pedestrian explanation could be that some subjects
believe that the payment is in dollars, not cents, despite
the clear instructions that stated that payment would be in
cents. One subject did email us insisting that payment was
supposed to be in dollars—we sent him screen shots proving
this was not the case.
Assume that in the absence of“modulo 5”targeting, the pro-
portion of subjects earning amounts divisible by 5 should be
equal, in expectation, to the proportion of potentially real-
izable amounts divisible by 5. Consider the set of possible
whole-cent earnings:
Pw = {bP (1)c, bP (2)c, . . . bP (N)c}
and the fraction of those elements of Pw that are divisible
by 5, which is given by:
q = |Pw|−1
∑
x∈Pw
1{x mod 5 = 0}
where |.| indicates the number of elements in the set. Let Y
be the set of realized output choices for an experiment group
and let n be the number of observations, n = |Y| and let
s be the actual number of observations in Y such that the
whole-cent earnings were divisible by 5: s =
∑
y∈Y 1{bP (y)c
mod 5 = 0}
Under our assumption of proportionally, we can compute
the probability of observing s successes out of n trials when
the per-trial probability of success is q. We had 33 successes
out of 99 trials when the probability was only q = 0.22.
The probability of observing this many successes or more
by chance is only 0.0027.
7. CONCLUSION
We find some agreement with a simple rational model, as
well as important anomolies; we find fairly strong evidence
that at least some worker’s work to targets. Designers should
consider this propensity when designing incentives schemes
and give people natural targets that will increase output,
though they should also consider that such schemes might
seem manipulative and could backfire (and potentially be
unethical).
In the following section, we demonstrate how our calibrated
model can be used in applied work. While we only find par-
tial agreement between the model’s predictions and reality,
we beleive it still offers a useful approximation. We conclude
by discussing how our paper fits into a larger research pro-
gram and lay out some directions for future investigations..
7.1 Using the calibrated model
It is straightforward to use our calibrated model for pre-
diction. Consider some crowdsourcing task that takes t0 to
complete and that will pay a piece-rate of p0. Workers whose
reservation wage exceeds the offered wage, p0/t0, will accept
the task. The fraction of workers producing at least one unit
of output is equal to the probability that a given worker
will find participating attractive: Pr(p0 ≥ ωit0) = F
(
p0
t0
)
where F is the cumuliative density function of the estimated
reservation wage distribution.
The labor supply curve is S(w) = NsF (logw), where Ns
is the number of workers in the population and w = p0/t0.
The point elasticity of extensive labor supply is thus w =
f(logw)/F (logw). To compute the intensive elasticity, we
would have to know something about the change in marginal
costs.11
11If we learn that c(y) = ωyt + (y − 1)2ν, output on the
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Figure 6: Earnings in the HIGH Group. This plot shows the distribution of output, grouped by the whole
digit of worker earnings (in cents). The vertical axis scale is not shown and is scaled differently by groups.
However, each horizontal white line indicates a gap of one.
If we pool estimates from both experiments and assume that
wages are log normally distributed, the distribution parame-
ters are µˆ = 0.074 and σˆ = 1.634, with the reservation wage
measured in dollars per hour. In Table 2, the 25th, 50th and
75th percentiles of the pooled reservation wage distribution
are shown, as well as the extensive labor supply elasticity
computed at that point using the log normal approxima-
tion. Consisent with a right-skewed distribution like the log
normal, the arithmetic mean is considerably higher than the
median wage.
Table 2: Pooled reservation wage distribution prop-
erties
Wage ($/hour) Point Elasticity
25th p. 0.321 0.81
Median 1.384 0.43
75th p. 2.876 0.28
Mean 3.625 0.24
It is important to remember the fairly strong assumptions
underlying these predictions. First, the reservation wage
distribution was estimated using a selected sample of AMT
workers willing to participate in our experiment. Second,
we are assuming constant marginal costs, and we are assum-
ing that task amenities/dis-amenities for the new task are
equivalent to those from the back-and-forth clicking task we
used. Third, we are assuming that there is a fixed reserva-
intensive margin can be predicted: each worker produces
y∗, such that p(y∗)− ωt+ 2νy∗ = 0.
tion wage and that workers respond rationally to the offered
wage, despite some evidence to the contrary.
7.2 Future research
Crowdsourcing is still a new development and many open
questions remain. Perhaps the most obvious next empirical
step is to collect data on the compensating differentials asso-
ciated with different kinds of crowdsourcing tasks. In other
words, compared to a baseline task, how much more or less
do workers have to be paid to generate the same amount of
output? A related question is how costs change with output,
i.e., does a task get much easier or much harder as the worker
gains experience? Finally, it would be interesting to learn
about the correlates of reservation wages. For example, do
groups with lower opportunity costs (e.g., the unemployed,
non-US citizens, etc.) have lower reservation wages?
Perhaps the biggest limitation of the current model is that it
only predicts the fraction of workers that will accept a task.
It tells us nothing about how many workers will actually see
a given offer on AMT. In our experience, the time since a
HIT was posted affects uptake, presumably because “fresh”
HITs are easier to find when searching by date posted. Fur-
thermore, AMT workers are not uniformly distributed across
time zones and presumably the number of potential work-
ers waxes and wanes over the day. It would be useful to
learn more about search and uptake and it might shed light
on the process of job search—a topic of great interest to
economists.
7.3 Main contribution
We view our paper as a step towards the theoretical frame-
work for crowdsourcing/human computation advocated by
[14]. Jain and Parkes argue (correctly in our view) that
advances in crowdsourcing as a methodology will require
broadly applicable, predictive models. They discuss game
theory as a potential generalizing framework, but point out
that crowdsourcing “games” are not so much about workers
revealing private information (which would suggest a mech-
anism design approach) as they are about getting workers
to show up and exert the effort needed to accomplish a task.
In a labor relationship, there is a “game” between work-
ers and their employers: workers must choose how much
(costly) effort to provide and employers—who prefer high
effort—cannot directly observe this choice. This classic prin-
cipal/agent problem arises in many real-world contexts, but
we argue that in most crowdsourcing applications, it is a
fairly easy problem to solve.12 When effort is highly corre-
lated with output and output is observable, simple mecha-
nisms can eliminate moral hazard. By rejecting low quality
work (or not hiring low quality workers in the future), buyers
can easily make shirking a dominated strategy.
Although the moral hazard problem is solvable, the problem
of getting a sufficient supply of labor persists. Once an em-
ployer sets up a quality control mechanism (e.g., screening,
firing, spot checks, etc.), the worker is essentially playing
a game against nature. Individual workers will make la-
bor supply decisions by comparing the costs and benefits of
working, and although workers must think rationally about
their preferences, they do not have to think strategically.
In short, we do not need a game theory of crowdsourcing,
but rather a price theory of crowdsourcing. Our model and
reservation wage estimation procedure provide the ground-
work for such a theory.
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